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3Abstract
When the United States acted to phase-out its estate tax by 2010, it joined a small 
but growing group of countries which have also repealed their wealth transfer taxes. In 
Canada, federal gift and estate taxes were repealed in 1972 and provincial wealth transfer 
taxes were abolished in the 1970s and 1980s. In Australia, State and Commonwealth 
wealth transfer taxes were repealed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. New Zealand 
followed suit in the 1990s, reducing estate tax rates to zero in 1992 and repealing the tax 
in 1999.
This paper reviews the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, relying on public choice theories of politically efficient revenue structures 
to help explain the repeal of these taxes in each country. Part II outlines the essential 
elements of public choice theory and its implications for tax policy. Part III surveys the 
history of wealth transfer taxes in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, examining in 
detail the events leading up to the repeal of these taxes, and illustrating the relevance of 
public choice theory to their abolition in each country. Part IV offers brief conclusions on 
the significance of this experience for the future of wealth transfer taxation in these and 
other countries.
4I. Introduction
When the U.S. Congress voted to phase-out the federal estate tax by 2010 and 
President Bush signed the legislation in June 2001,1 the United States joined a small but 
growing number of developed countries in which taxes on the transfer of wealth have 
been abolished.2 In Canada, federal gift and estate taxes were repealed in 1972 and 
provincial wealth transfer taxes were abolished in the 1970s and 1980s. In Australia, 
State and Commonwealth wealth transfer taxes were repealed in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. New Zealand followed suit in the 1990s, reducing estate tax rates to zero in 1992 
and repealing the tax in 1999. While the United Kingdom continues to collect taxes on 
the transfer of wealth, the role of these taxes has declined substantially over the last 30 
years,3 and calls for repeal are often heard.4 As a result, U.S. repeal should no be viewed 
as an isolated event but as part of a broader international trend.
1
 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 
(2001). The phase-out is accomplished by increasing the exclusion amount and reducing rates between 
2002 and 2009, culminating in repeal for the year 2010. Under a sunset provision, however, the legislation 
providing for this phase-out and repeal is itself repealed after December 31, 2010 – resulting in the 
restoration of the tax in 2011. For a detailed description of this legislation, see Tye J. Klooster, “Repeal of 
the Death Tax? Shoving Aside the Rhetoric to Determine the Consequences of the Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001” (2003), 51 Drake L. Rev. 633-65. According to one commentator, 
“[t]he fact that there will be two presidential and four congressional elections before the estate tax is fully 
repealed means that it is possible that the repeal will never happen at all or that the sunset provision will 
stand and the estate tax will return in 2011.” Mary R. Wampler, “Repealing the Federal Estate Tax: Death 
to the Death Tax, or Will Reform Save the Day?” (2001), 25 Seton Hall L.J. 525 at 534.
2
 For an excellent account of the events leading up to repeal in the U.S., see Michael J. Graetz and Ian 
Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing Inherited Wealth, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). For a recent argument that Congress might benefit from uncertainty regarding 
repeal of the federal gift and estate taxes, see Edward J. McCaffery and Linda R. Cohen, “Shakedown at 
Gucci Gulch: A Tale of Death, Money and Taxes” University of Southern California Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 04-20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=581084.
3
 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Revenue Statistics of O.E.C.D. Countries, 
(2003), available online at http://hermia.ingentaselect.com/vl=4595239/cl=65/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/ 
16081099/v55n1/contp1-1.htm (in 1972, estate and gift taxes accounted for 2.3 percent of total revenues in 
the U.K. and 0.7 percent of gross domestic product; in 2002, these figures were 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent 
respectively).
4
 See, e.g., Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Euthanasia for Death Duties: Putting Inheritance Tax Out of its 
Misery, (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2002). The Conservative Party’s 2005 election platform 
calls for cuts to the U.K. Inheritance Tax, but not repeal.
5Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of these taxes,5 commentators are often 
puzzled by the apparent political vulnerability of wealth transfer taxes since they 
generally apply only to a small percentage of substantial estates.6 For some, political 
opposition to these taxes stems from psychological factors, such as the association 
between the tax and death,7 or an irrational optimism on the part of many people that they 
will actually be subject to the tax.8 For others, it is largely ideological, reflecting a 
conservative emphasis on individual enterprise and an increased hostility to redistributive 
taxation.9 Although conservative electoral victories have certainly contributed to the 
decline of wealth transfer taxes,10 however, more progressive political parties have also 
5
 The merits of these taxes are widely disputed. Advocates tend to emphasize their contribution to tax 
progressivity, their social role to lessen inequalities and unequal opportunities, and their assumed economic 
superiority to income taxes. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, “To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It” (1983), 
93 Yale L.J. 259; Eric Rakowski, “Transferring Wealth Liberally” (1996), 51 Tax L. Rev. 419; and Joseph 
A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy, 5th ed., (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987) at 234 
(commenting that wealth transfer taxes have “less adverse effects on incentives than do income taxes of 
equal yield”). Critics, on the other hand, condemn their relatively low revenue yield, high collection costs, 
avoidability, and alleged impact on savings and entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Richard E. Wagner, Death and 
Taxes: Some Perspectives on Inheritance, Inequality, and Progressive Taxation, (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1973);  Joel C. Dobris, “A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes” 
(1984), 35 Syracuse L. rev. 1215; Edward J. McCaffery, “The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation” 
(1994), 104 Yale L.J. 283; and Edward J. McCaffery, “The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax” 
(1994), 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 281. For my own views on wealth transfer taxation, see David G. Duff, 
“Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument” (1993), 6 Can. J. L. & Juris. 3.
6
 In the United States. for example, only 4.3 percent of decedents were required to file estate tax returns in 
1998, and only half of these were required to pay any tax. See William G. Gale and Joel Slemrod, 
“Overview” in William G. Gale, James R. Hines Jr., and Joel Slemrod, eds., Rethinking Estate and Gift 
Taxation, (Washingston, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001) 1-64 at 7-9. In the United Kingdom, it is 
estimated that only 3.5 to 4 percent of estates pay inheritance tax. See Domenic Maxwell, Fair Dues: 
Towards a more progressive inheritance tax, (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2004) at 11.
7
 See, e.g., Richard Bird, “The Taxation of Personal Wealth in International Perspective” (1991), 17 Can. 
Pub. Pol’y 322 at 330 (pointing to “the conjuncture of two events [death and taxes] that few people 
contemplate with pleasure”).
8
 See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 5 at 285.
9
 See, e.g., Keith G. Banting, “The Politics of Wealth Taxes” (1991), 17 Can. Pub. Pol’y 351 at 364. See 
also Edward J. McCaffery, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003) at 66 (suggesting that wealth transfer taxes contradict “common-sense 
morality”). For a detailed study of the relationship between ideological perspectives and wealth transfer 
taxes in Canada, see Lisa Philipps, Taxing Inherited Wealth:  Ideologies About Property and the Family in 
Canada, LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School (1992).
10
 In the United States, for example, Republican control of the Congress and the White House precipitated 
repeal of the federal estate tax in 2001. See Graetz and Shapiro, supra note 2. Likewise, in Australia, 
6been willing to abandon these taxes and have been reluctant to restore them once 
repealed.11
In addition to these explanations for the decline and repeal of wealth transfer 
taxes, public choice theory provides an alternative account, emphasizing the political 
costs and benefits of different tax policies and the tendency for electoral competition to 
promote “political efficiency” in the revenue structures adopted by governments over 
time.12 To the extent that wealth transfer taxes entail greater political costs and fewer 
perceived benefits than other tax measures yielding comparable revenue yields, it is not 
surprising that they might be politically vulnerable.
This paper examines the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, relying on public choice theories of politically efficient revenue 
structures to help explain the repeal of these taxes in each country. Part II outlines the 
essential elements of this theoretical approach and its implications for tax policy. Part III 
surveys the history of wealth transfer taxes in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
examining in detail the events leading up to the repeal of these taxes, and illustrating the 
relevance of public choice theory to their abolition in each country. Part IV offers brief 
conclusions on the significance of this experience for the future of wealth transfer 
taxation.
electoral victory by the Liberal Party under Malcolm Fraser preceded the repeal of the federal estate tax 
effective 1 July 1979.
11
 In Canada, for example, it was the Liberal Party under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau which repealed the 
federal gift and estate taxes in 1971, notwithstanding that Trudeau had campaigned and won the 1968 
election by promising a “Just Society”. Similarly in Australia, Labour Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
promised to abolish federal death duties in 1975 in an unsuccessful bid to stay in office. In the U.S. as well, 
as Graetz and Shapiro document, Democrats have been reluctant to defend the estate tax. See Graetz and 
Shapiro, supra note 2. 
12
 See, e.g., Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer, Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and W. Irwin Gillespie, Tax, Borrow 
and Spend: Financing Federal Spending in Canada., 1867-1900, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1991).
7II. Public Choice Theory and Tax Policy
In the fields of public finance and tax policy, much writing is essentially 
normative, establishing criteria for an ideal tax structure and evaluating actual tax 
regimes against this ideal.13 In contrast, public choice theories of politically efficient 
revenue structures are largely positive, attempting to explain the kinds of tax structures 
and tax reforms that actually exist in modern democratic societies.14 The following 
sections provide a brief introduction to this theoretical approach, explaining the main 
determinants of political efficiency within this framework and the manner in which 
political efficiency is apt to be pursued through tax policy.
A. Public Choice and Political Efficiency
Public choice theory has been defined as “the economic study of nonmarket 
decision making” or “the application of economics to political science.”15 As such, it 
concerns itself with traditional topics of political science such as voting behaviour, party 
politics, and interest group activities, but examines these phenomena through the lens of 
economic methodology premised on rational choice subject to constraints.16 As economic 
13
 This is true of traditional public finance as well as more recent theories of optimal taxation. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy B. Musgrave, and Richard M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1987); and James A. Mirrlees, “An Exploration in the Theory of 
Optimum Income Taxation” (1971), 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175. It is also true of much legal tax scholarship, 
particularly scholarship based on the Haig-Simons concept of income, and the concept of tax expenditures 
pioneered by Stanley Surrey. See Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income 
as a Problem of Fiscal Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938); and Stanley S. Surrey, 
Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1973).
14
 Gillespie, supra note 12 at 14-17. Not surprisingly, of course, these positive theories may have normative 
implications regarding, for example, constitutional arrangements regarding the manner in which revenue 
decisions are made. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). See also 
Gillespie, supra note 12 at 17 (suggesting that “a positive model of revenue structure could assist those of 
us who advise governments on the tax changes that ought to be made”).
15
 Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 1.
16 Ibid. at 1-2.
8analysis predicts that a perfectly competitive market tends toward an equilibrium at 
which economic resources are efficiently allocated, so public choice theory predicts that 
competition among political parties tends toward a political equilibrium where public 
policies assume a politically efficient form.17 In order to understand this concept of 
political efficiency and the form that it is likely to take, it is useful to examine the 
motivations and constraints that public choice theory assigns to the central actors in the 
political process: voters, politicians and political parties, and organized interest groups.18
1. Voters
The starting point for a public choice theory of political efficiency is a set of 
assumptions regarding voters and the reason why they vote. Sharing with economic 
theory the premise that individuals are rational utility maximizers,19 public choice theory 
postulates that voters will generally cast their ballots for candidates and political parties 
whose policies are expected to maximize their net utility.20 In the context of government 
expenditure and revenue policies, public choice theories generally assume that voters will 
favour candidates and political parties whose policies are expected to maximize the 
benefits that they receive from government expenditures while minimizing the taxes that 
17
 See, e.g., Hettich and Winer, supra note 12 at 2; and Gillespie, supra note 12 at 16.
18
 Although it is not essential for the purpose of this paper, many public choice theories also consider the 
behaviour of the bureaucracy and the mass media. See, e.g., Douglas G. Hartle, The Expenditure Budget 
Process of the Government of Canada: A Public Choice-Rent Seeking Perspective, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 81 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) at 35-68.
19
 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 15 at 2.
20
 For an early expression of this rational voter hypothesis, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). See also Gordon Tullock, Towards a Mathematics of 
Politics, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967) at 110-114; and William Riker and Peter 
Ordeshook, Introduction to Positive Political Theory, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). While 
the concept of “utility” for this purpose might be broadly defined to include an inter-subjective interest in 
the welfare of others or a Kantian concern with just social institutions, public choice theory tends to ignore 
this possibility by assuming an egoistic conception of human beings and a narrow and self-interested notion 
of utility.
9they are required to pay.21 Voters may also favour certain kinds of taxes over others, 
notwithstanding that amounts owing are the same, suggesting that differential preferences 
for different kinds of taxes may also play a role in voting decisions.22
In addition to the hypothesis that voters will select candidates and political parties 
whose policies are expected to maximize their net utility, public choice theory also 
predicts that voting decisions are generally based on limited knowledge of actual policies 
and their likely consequences. Since the time and effort to obtain this information is 
considerable, and the probability of one’s vote affecting the outcome of an election is 
negligible, public choice theory predicts that most voters will remain “rationally 
ignorant” of most policies – ignoring specific details and basing their choices on 
perceived impacts on net utility as well as more general perceptions of trustworthiness 
and feelings of emotional attachment.23 In the field of tax policy, this phenomenon is 
likely to be particularly pronounced given the complexity of the issues involved.24 Since 
the expected benefits of acquiring information are greater where policies touch on one’s 
most immediate interests, however, voters are likely to devote more resources to inform 
21
 See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 12 at 17 (explaining that political parties in the pursuit of electoral victory 
attempt to “maximize the political benefits from spending and minimize the political costs of financing the 
spending”).
22 Ibid. at 26-27. To the extent that differential preferences for different kinds of taxes reflect notions of tax 
fairness, the recognition of these tax preferences as a factor in voting decisions suggests that voters may be 
motivated by something other than self-interest narrowly understood. For an attempt to rationalize ideas of 
tax fairness in terms of utility maximization, see Douglas G. Hartle, Political Economy of Tax Reform: Six 
Case Studies, Discussion Paper No. 290 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1985) at 52-54.
23
 See, e.g., Downs, supra note 20, chapters 11-13.
24
 See, e.g., Douglas G. Hartle, “Some Analytical, Political and Normative Lessons from Carter” in W. Neil 
Brooks, ed., The Quest for Tax Reform, (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 415 (suggesting that most voters’ 
perceptions of their own interests are “more likely than not, seriously flawed when it comes to the details of 
the tax structure as a whole”); and Banting, supra note 9 (emphasizing that “[m]ost voters are not well-
informed about the complex world of taxation” and that “[t]here is limited understanding not only of 
technical language and abstract concepts such as equity, but also of elementary issues such as whether one 
would benefit from a specific proposal”).
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themselves about these measures.25 As a result, affluent individuals and corporations can 
be expected to be much better informed and well-advised than most about the taxes they 
pay and about the tax policies proposed by politicians and political parties.26
Not surprisingly, critics have challenged as limited and unrealistic both the self-
interested view of voting that public choice theory assumes and the egoistic conception of 
human beings on which it is based.27 Indeed, since it is irrational to expect that a single 
vote will affect the outcome of an election, the very act of voting itself suggests that 
voters must be motivated by considerations other than self-interested utility maximization 
narrowly defined.28 While one might attempt to rescue the theory of self-interested voting 
by assuming a psychological benefit from the act of voting,29 or distinguishing the 
(unselfish) decision to vote from the (selfish) choice of candidate or political party, it 
seems more realistic to admit that altruistic and ethical motivations are likely to mix with 
more selfish considerations when voters case their ballots.30 At the same time, the theory 
that most voters remain rationally ignorant of actual policies calls into question the 
significance of their votes for public policy more generally.31
25
 Hartle, supra note 22 at 25.
26
 See, e.g., Banting, supra note 9 at 353 (observing that “those with a large stake in tax battles inform 
themselves and equip themselves with a phalanx of professional advisors”).
27
 See, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics” 
(1984), 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 279; and Herbert Hovenkamp, “Legislation, Well-Being and Public Choice” 
(1990), 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63. For more general criticisms of public choice theory, see Mark Kelman, “On 
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ‘Empirical’ Practice of the Public Choice 
Movement” (1988), 74 Va. L. Rev. 199; and Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public 
Choice: A Critical Introduction, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
28
 See the discussion of this “paradox” of voting, see Mueller, supra note 15 at 348-69.
29
 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, “Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process 
as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1990s” (1990), 139 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1 at 77 (suggesting that the act 
of voting can be understood as a source of utility in itself, “involving symbolic or expressive behavior”).
30
 See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin and Kevin W.S. Roberts, “The Ethical Voter” (1975), 69 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.
926; Howard Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982); and Amitai Etzioni, “The Case for a Multiple Utility Conception” (1986), 2 Econ. & Phil. 159.
31
 See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives” 
(1984), 28 American Behavioral Scientist 185 (arguing that voting decisions are primarily expressive or 
symbolic rather than instrumental).
11
While these criticisms undoubtedly lessen the predictive power of public choice 
theory to some extent, they do not render it worthless. On the contrary, although it is 
probably mistaken to assume that altruistic and ethical motivations play no role in voting 
decisions, it is also likely that selfish considerations have a significant effect on the 
choices that are ultimately made. Similarly, while imperfect information weakens the link 
between voting decisions and public policy outcomes, it seems unlikely that voters will 
systematically ignore their own interests on a consistent basis, and it is important to 
recognize that voters are likely to be more knowledgeable about policies affecting their 
most immediate interests. For these reasons, the basic premise of public choice theory 
that voters will tend to favour candidates and political parties whose policies are 
perceived to maximize their net utility is likely to have considerable predictive value, 
notwithstanding the phenomenon of rational ignorance and the narrow conception of 
human motivation on which public choice theory is based.
2. Politicians and Political Parties
For public choice theory, politicians and political parties, like voters, are also 
assumed to be rational utility maximizers.32 Unlike voters, however, who pursue this goal 
by casting ballots for candidates and political parties whose policies are perceived to 
maximize their net utility, politicians and political parties are presumed to maximize their 
utility by winning elections.33 Since voters are assumed to favour candidates and political 
parties whose policies are expected to maximize their net utility, moreover, it follows that 
elections are most likely to be won by politicians and political parties whose platforms 
32
 Mueller, supra note 15 at 179.
33
 See, e.g., Downs, supra note 20 at 28. 
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are perceived to maximize the net utility of the largest number of voters.34 However, 
because voter preferences are not immediately transparent to politicians and political 
parties, and voters themselves are generally unfamiliar with specific policies, public 
choice theories also predict that politicians and political parties can increase the 
likelihood of electoral success by employing strategies and obtaining resources that 
enable them to better discern voter preferences (e.g., by consulting with interest groups, 
polling, and pre-testing policies with focus groups) and to promote their policies and 
images (e.g., through media exposure and advertising).35
As with public choice theories of voting behaviour, critics have also questioned 
the assumption that politicians and political parties are driven solely by the goal of 
electoral success.36 Ideological objectives, for example, are undoubtedly also present, as 
politicians and political parties certainly seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their 
own best interests in order to win elections and to shape public policy outcomes 
according to their ideological preferences once in government or in opposition.37 More 
sophisticated public choice theories of politicians and political parties should also 
account for different institutions and electoral rules which may create different strategies 
for electoral success.38 In countries with proportional representation, for example, parties 
and politicians may pursue a narrow voting base instead of a majority block.
Notwithstanding other motivations, however, the logic of electoral competition 
suggests that politicians and political parties will over time not only seek electoral 
success, but will also devise campaign strategies and political platforms designed to 
34
 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 15 at 214 (suggesting that “competition for votes between candidates leads 
them ‘as if by an invisible hand’ to platforms that maximize social welfare”).
35
 See the discussion of “probabilistic voting” in ibid. at 196-216.
36
 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 29 at 81-87.
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appeal to the largest number of voters.39 Through a process of “natural selection”, 
therefore, one can expect that public policies in a democratic society will tend toward 
political efficiency.40
3. Organized Interest Groups
Interest groups constitute a third group of political actors who are central to public 
choice theories of political efficiency. Unlike voters and politicians, who are assumed to 
maximize their own individual utilities, interest groups are assumed to promote the 
common interests of their members.41 This is accomplished by informing members about 
public policy issues affecting their interests,42 lobbying politicians and political parties in 
order to obtain policies favourable to members,43 and promoting policies that advance the 
common interests of members through direct advertising and the mass media.44 As a 
general rule, these services take the form of public or collective goods the benefits from 
which cannot easily be limited to those who are willing to incur their costs through 
membership.45
37
 See the analysis of ideology in Mueller, supra note 15 at 286-301.
38
 See the discussion in ibid. at 217-28.
39
 See, e.g., Hartle, supra note 18 at xviii-xix (noting that when policies are politically inefficient, “there is 
an opportunity afforded the opposition parties to form a new coalition that will gain power at the expense 
of the ruling coalition).
40
 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 29 at 88 (referring to a process of “natural selection” that can play a role 
notwithstanding the motivations of some politicians or political parties). 
41
 See, e.g., Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1971) at 5-8. 
42
 See, e.g., Hartle, supra note 18 at 62-63 (referring to this as the “intelligence function” of organized 
interest groups).
43 Ibid. at 61 (observing that this lobbying generally involves the provision of information or funding). See 
also Mueller, supra note 15 at 205 (noting that interest groups “try to increase the welfare of their 
membership by reducing candidate uncertainty over how their membership votes”). 
44
 See, e.g., ibid. at 61 (referring to “costly publicity campaigns designed to convince tens of thousands of 
voters to support a desired candidate or party on a desired policy decision); and Hartle, supra note 24 at 
414 (emphasizing the “capacity of special interest groups to influence the mass media”).
45
 Olson, supra note 41 at 15.
14
Of particular importance to public choice theory is the existence of information 
and transactions costs and collective action (free-rider) problems that affect the likelihood 
that persons with common interests will establish and maintain an organized entity to 
promote their interests. Because persons are expected to be better informed about matters 
affecting their most immediate interests than about more general or public interests, 
public choice theory predicts that narrow or special interests will be better represented by 
organized interest groups than more general and public interests. Moreover, since the 
costs to establish and maintain an organized group and the incidence of free-riders are 
likely to increase as the number of potential members increases, public choice theory also 
predicts that relatively small numbers of persons with common interests are more likely 
to be represented by organized interest groups than large numbers of persons with 
common interests.46 In the field of tax policy, these considerations suggest that relatively 
small groups of taxpayers with common interests are much more likely to exercise 
political influence through organized interest groups than large groups of taxpayers with 
more diffuse interests.47
4. Public Policy and Political Efficiency
The motivations and constraints that public choice theory assigns to the central 
actors in the political process influence not only their expected behaviour within this 
framework, but also the kinds of public policies that are likely to maximize political 
efficiency. Since voters are predicted to be better informed about matters that touch on 
their immediate interests and less knowledgeable about other issues, for example, public 
choice theory suggests that political efficiency may be achieved by targeting government 
46
 See, e.g., ibid. at 46-52 (describing large unorganized interest groups as “latent” groups).
15
benefits to groups of voters who are apt to be well-informed about the benefits that they 
receive while distributing the related costs widely among groups of voters who are less 
likely to perceive the burdens that they bear.48 The more complex the nature of the
specific policy, moreover, the less likely it is that those who bear these costs will perceive 
the burden, lessening further the political costs of the policy.49 Differential transactions 
costs and collective action problems suggest a similar strategy for politically efficient 
public policies, involving the conferral of benefits on selected groups of voters who are 
well-represented by organized interest groups, and the allocation of related costs among 
more diffuse groups of voters for whom the financial and organizational barriers to 
collective political action are much greater.50 As a result, as Mancur Olson emphasized, 
differential information and organizational costs create “a systematic tendency for 
‘exploitation’ of the great by the small!”51
B. Political Efficiency and Tax Policy
If voters regard benefits from government expenditures as utility enhancing and 
taxes as utility reducing, the pursuit of political efficiency suggests that governments will 
attempt to maximize the political benefits from spending programs and minimize the 
political costs from the taxes necessary to finance these programs.52 For a given level of 
government expenditure, therefore, a politically efficient revenue structure will minimize 
the political costs associated with each tax – utilizing each revenue source, as one theorist 
47
 See, e.g., Banting, supra note 9 at 353; and Hartle, supra note 24 at 413-15 (emphasizing the influence of 
narrow and special interest groups in tax policy).
48
 See, e.g., Hartle, supra note 18 at 67.
49 Ibid. at 67-68.
50 Ibid.
51
 Olson, supra note 41 at 29 [emphasis in original].
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explains, “up to the point at which the marginal political cost is equal for all such 
sources.”53 Over time, moreover, a tendency toward political efficiency suggests that 
governments will increase and decrease tax rates on specific revenue sources as their 
relative political costs change, introduce new taxes when the political costs of so doing 
are less than the political costs from increasing the rate of an existing tax, and repeal old 
taxes when their political costs exceed those associated with other taxes.54 The key 
questions for a public choice theory of tax policy, therefore, concern the factors that 
affect the political costs of different taxes and the reasons why these political costs 
change over time.
Beginning with the factors affecting the political costs of different taxes, many 
can be identified.55 Most obviously, perhaps, the political costs of a tax can be expected 
to increase as its rate increases, since organized opposition to the tax is increasingly cost-
justified as tax burdens increase.56 The same reason also suggests that the political costs 
of a tax will increase as the costs to comply with the tax increase.57 Political costs are also 
likely to increase as costs to administer the tax increase, since diminished net revenues 
attributable to higher administrative costs necessitate higher tax rates or other taxes to 
52
 Gillespie, supra note 12 at 17. Jean Baptiste Colbert made a similar point long ago, explaining that: “The 
art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the least 
amount of hissing.”
53 Ibid. at 18.
54 Ibid.
55
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political costs other than those that he identifies, explaining that “[t]he model is general enough to permit 
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 Gillespie, supra note 12 at 21. To the extent that adverse economic consequences associated with 
different taxes increase as rates increase, this effect is a further reason why the political costs of a tax are 
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maintain revenues – both of which involve political costs.58 Conversely, the political 
costs of a tax tend to be lower where the number of taxpayers is large, since the burden is 
spread widely and the costs of organized opposition substantial.59 As the number of 
taxpayers affected by an established tax increases, however, political costs can be 
expected to increase because groups opposing the tax are likely to attract new members.60
Other important determinants of the political costs of taxes include vertical tax 
competition (the occupation of the same revenue source by different levels of government 
in a federal system), horizontal tax competition (the pursuit of mobile revenue sources by 
different national or sub-national governments), and base elasticity (the extent to which 
revenues automatically increase with economic growth). In principle, the occupation of a 
revenue source by one level of government tends to increase the political cost of its 
imposition by another level of government, since at least some organized opposition to 
the tax is likely to exist already, the collection of tax by the second government increases 
the effective rate of the tax, and the first government itself can be expected to oppose the 
measure.61 Political costs are also high for mobile revenue sources, since those subject to 
the tax may threaten to or actually relocate these sources to jurisdictions with lower taxes, 
57 Ibid. at 29-30; and Hartle, supra note 22 at 52 (observing that higher compliance costs “can be thought of 
as an increase in the tax burden”).
58
 Gillespie, supra note 12 at 29-30; and Hartle, supra note 22 at 52.
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61 Ibid. at 27-28. See also Hartle, supra note 22 at 49 (explaining that governments are likely to oppose 
occupation of the same revenue source by another level of government because “taxpayers may incorrectly 
assign the ‘blame’ to the ‘wrong’ government; second, taxpayer opposition probably mounts exponentially 
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thereby depriving the higher-tax jurisdiction of revenue and economic activity.62 Base 
elasticity, on the other hand, decreases the political costs of a tax, since economic growth 
allows governments to increase spending without having to increase effective tax rates.63
A final factor affecting the political costs of taxes is what W. Irwin Gillespie 
describes as “tax preference” – a preference for one kind of tax versus another 
notwithstanding that amounts owing under each tax would be identical.64 While different 
tax preferences might turn on compliance costs or other non-revenue impacts,65 they 
might also depend on judgements about the appropriateness or fairness of alternative 
revenue sources.66 As Gillespie explains, a preference for one tax over another “could 
arise because one revenue source is judged by citizens to be the product of their own, 
meritorious efforts (say, labour income), whereas another revenue source is judged not to 
be the result of hard work (say, an inheritance, a gift or a lottery win).”67 Alternatively, he 
suggests, different tax preferences might exist “because one revenue source is judged by 
taxpayers to have unhealthy, immoral or sinful connotations (expenditures on alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco products), whereas the connotations of another revenue source are 
seen as healthy, moral or meritorious (expenditures on milk, footwear and clothing for 
children and expenditures on charitable donations).”68 Whatever the reasons for these tax 
preferences, the political cost to introduce, maintain or increase a tax for which a large 
62
 Gillespie, supra note 12 at 28-29.
63 Ibid. at 30.
64 Ibid. at 26 (hypothesizing that voters “may not be indifferent between two revenue sources, for each of 
which the tax per dollar’s worth of tax base could be equal for a given taxpayer”).
65
 See, e.g., ibid. (suggesting that different tax preferences “could arise because verification of one revenue 
source interferes more directly in the conduct of a citizen’s affairs (say, a direct tax on incomes, compared 
with an indirect tax on imports)”).
66 Ibid. at 27 (noting that voters may be less politically opposed to taxes that are perceived to be fair than 
they are to taxes that are perceived to be unfair).
67 Ibid. at 26.
68 Ibid.
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number of voters have a lower preference will be greater than the political cost to 
introduce, maintain or increase a tax for which a large number of voters have a greater 
tax preference.69
Having identified some of the key factors affecting the political costs of different 
taxes, it is possible to speculate on various reasons why these political costs might change 
over time. Changes in government expenditures, for example, are likely to affect the 
political costs of taxes – increasing these costs where rates are increased or exemptions 
reduced in order to finance increased spending, and decreasing these costs where 
spending reductions allow taxes to be cut. Actions by other governments can also affect 
the political costs of different taxes – increasing these costs where other levels of 
government introduce or increase taxes on the same revenue source, but decreasing these 
costs where neighbouring governments at the same level introduce or increase taxes on 
the same revenue source. Another reason why the political costs of different taxes might 
change involves broader economic changes, as increasing economic integration has 
undoubtedly increased the political costs of taxes on mobile revenue sources. Inflation 
can also increase the political costs of a tax, if exemptions are not indexed or adjusted to 
offset their declining real value. Finally, ideological shifts are likely to change the 
political costs of different taxes to the extent that they influence people’s preferences for 
different kinds of taxes. For public choice theories of political efficient revenue 
structures, however, the reasons for changes in the political costs of different taxes are 
considered exogenous and not themselves subjects of inquiry.
69 Ibid.
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III. Wealth Transfer Taxes in Canada, Australia and New Zealand
Wealth transfer taxes were first introduced in the Australian colonies and New
Zealand in the second half of the nineteenth century,70 and by all Canadian provinces 
between the years 1892 and 1903.71 In Australia and New Zealand, these taxes were 
generally based on the estates of persons domiciled in the taxing jurisdiction, though 
Queensland and South Australia opted for succession duties with rates and exemptions 
applied to amounts received by beneficiaries,72 and New Zealand’s tax depended both on 
the size of the estate and the degree of consanguinity between the beneficiary and the 
deceased.73 In Canada, the constitutional restriction on provincial taxing powers to 
“Direct Taxation within the Province”74 meant that provinces limited their death duties to 
property situated within the province upon the death of the owner, and to property 
situated outside the province only if the deceased was domiciled in the province and the 
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beneficiary was resident or domiciled in the province.75 Rates were determined both by 
the value of the estate and by the relationship between the deceased and the beneficiary.76
In each of these jurisdictions, wealth transfer taxes were the first major direct 
taxes to be imposed, marking a major departure from an earlier era in which governments 
were financed almost entirely from customs duties and excise taxes.77 Although the 
introduction of these taxes reflected an important political shift from regressive indirect 
taxes to progressive direct taxes,78 their primary rationale appears to have been to raise 
revenue.79 In Australia, revenues from estate duties exceeded 30 percent of total State tax 
revenues in 1909/10,80 and continued to account for a significant share of State tax 
revenues until the late 1960s.81 In Canada, provincial succession duties accounted for 
almost 40 percent of provincial tax revenues in 1913,82 and remained substantial 
contributors to provincial finances until 1946, when most provinces ceded occupancy of 
75
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this field to the federal government.83 In New Zealand, the estate tax accounted for 13.5 
percent of government revenues in 1915, but declined thereafter.84
Revenue considerations were also central to the decision of the Commonwealth 
government in Australia to enact a national estate duty in 1914, and the decision of the 
federal government in Canada to enact a succession duty in 1941. In Australia, estate 
duty and income tax were enacted in order to help finance participation in the First World 
War, after revenues from customs and excise duties collapsed due to the disruption of 
trade.85 In Canada, where a federal income tax was enacted primarily for revenue reasons 
during the First World War,86 the main justification by Minister of Finance J.L. Ilsley for 
the introduction of a federal succession duty was “the compelling need for revenue” to 
fight the Second World War.87 At the same time, he emphasized, since the provinces had 
“not fully occupied” the field, there was “room for an additional and independent 
82
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dominion tax” as a permanent source of federal revenue.88 As a percentage of total tax 
revenues, however, federal wealth transfer taxes in Australia and Canada were never very 
large, accounting for only 2 to 4 percent of federal tax revenues in Australia from 1914 to 
1940 and no more than 1.4 percent of federal tax revenues in the post-war period,89 and 
contributing no more than 1.7 percent of federal tax revenues in Canada.90
In Australia, the introduction of the national estate duty led to a lengthy period in 
which the Commonwealth and State governments jointly occupied the wealth transfer tax 
field. Despite recurring proposals to allocate this revenue source solely to the States,91 or 
solely to the Commonwealth government,92 joint occupancy continued until the taxes 
were repealed at both levels of government in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, 
although the Commonwealth and State governments cooperated to some extent in the 
administration of these taxes,93 Australia’s “double or duplicative” wealth transfer tax 
replaced by an estate tax with progressive rates based solely on the aggregate value of the estate. A gift tax 
had been introduced in 1935, primarily to discourage income-splitting under the federal income tax.
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89
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system was a source of considerable complexity and high compliance and administration 
costs.94
In Canada, complete joint occupancy lasted only from 1942 to 1946, when all 
provinces but Ontario and Quebec agreed to withdraw from the collection of succession 
duties as well as personal and corporate income taxation in return for unconditional 
grants from the federal government.95 In order to relieve the estates of decedents in 
Ontario and Quebec from the combined burden of federal and provincial taxes, the 
federal succession duty was amended to provide a credit for provincial succession duties 
up to 50 percent of the federal tax otherwise payable.96 In 1957, the unconditional grant 
system was replaced by a series of agreements under which most provinces continued to 
relinquish succession duties to the federal government in exchange for “rental payments” 
equal to 50 percent of federal collections of succession duties in each province.97 In 
Ontario and Quebec, which refused to “rent” their succession duties to the federal 
government, the federal tax was reduced in the form of a 50 percent abatement that 
replaced the former tax credit.98 In 1964, British Columbia withdrew from this “tax rental 
agreement” and began to collect its own succession duty, receiving the same abatement 
94
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98 Ibid. (emphasizing that the substitution of the abatement for the tax credit “amounted to a change merely 
in form, not in substance”).
25
as was available in Ontario and Quebec.99 The next year, federal rental payments for this 
revenue source were increased to 75 percent, with a corresponding increase in the 
abatement allowed under the federal tax.100 While British Columbia increased its 
succession duty to take full advantage of this abatement, Ontario and Quebec left their 
succession duties unchanged, opting to receive rental payments equal to 25 percent of 
federal collections in their provinces.101 As a result, while federal-provincial agreements 
simplified the collection of wealth transfer taxes in seven of ten Canadian provinces, the 
combination of federal and provincial taxes in the remaining three was as complicated 
and “duplicative” as the system in Australia. More importantly, perhaps, the federal 
government’s agreement to return 75 percent of federal wealth transfer tax revenues to 
the province where the tax was collected (or to abate the federal tax by up to 75 percent 
where a province collected its own tax) might be expected to significantly weaken its 
commitment to the tax. As the following sections demonstrate, however, complexity and 
revenue yield are only two of many reasons why wealth transfer taxes were abolished in 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
A. The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes in Canada
The specific events leading to the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Canada 
began somewhat innocuously with the appointment of a Royal Commission on Taxation 
(the Carter Commission) in 1962, unfolded at the federal level between 1967 and 1971 as 
the federal government responded to the Report of the Carter Commission, and continued 
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
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at the provincial level over the following fourteen years. This section examines each of 
these phases.
1. The Carter Commission: 1962- 1967
Promised by Progressive-Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in the 
opening speech of his 1962 election campaign,102 an independent commission had long 
been favoured by tax professionals and business leaders as a vehicle to reduce 
progressive rates, simplify administration and enforcement, and address technical 
anomalies in the income tax.103 When the Progressive-Conservative Party formed a 
minority government after the election, Diefenbaker announced the appointment of a 
Royal Commission comprising mainly professionals and businesspersons and chaired by 
Toronto accountant Kenneth Carter.104 The Carter Commission’s terms of reference were 
extremely broad, involving a review of all aspects of federal taxation including “income, 
sales and excise taxes and estate duties”.105
Given its origins and its membership, there was every reason to expect that the 
Commission would affirm the prevailing “tax orthodoxy” of business and professional 
commentators that taxes were too high, that indirect sales or value-added taxes should be 
considered as alternatives to high income taxes, and that wealth transfer taxes were 
102
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causing Canadian family businesses to be sold to foreigners.106 Indeed, submissions to the 
Commission, most of which were from the same business and professional interests 
which had pushed for its establishment,107 tended to repeat these views in more technical 
form.108 According to the Shoe Manufacturers’ Association of Canada, for example, 
“[t]he unreasonably high level of succession duties has been the largest single factor both 
in encouraging the sellout of Canadian enterprises to foreign interests and in eliminating 
from the economic scene continuing independent family businesses.”109 The Canadian 
Bar Association decried the “excessive amount of property” that was tied up for long 
periods of time in trusts to avoid wealth transfer taxes, concluding that these 
arrangements “frequently restrict the company’s proper development and expansion and 
may add to production costs.”110 On the basis of these and other submissions, Canada’s 
leading financial newspaper concluded that “the economic damage” caused by these 
taxes was “staggering.” 111
As well as accepting submissions, the Commission embarked on an ambitious 
research programme, lasting four years and costing approximately $4 million.112 Among 
27 research studies, one found no evidence that the estate tax was a major factor in the 
sale of small businesses.113 Others challenged the non-taxation of capital gains, which 
were traditionally excluded from the source concept of income that Canada had borrowed 
106
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from the United Kingdom.114 Another study examined the incidence of taxation Canada, 
concluding that the tax system as a whole was regressive for at least the poorest third of 
Canadian families and possibly more.115 After much delay, and two intervening elections 
resulting in Liberal minority governments, the Commission’s six-volume Report was 
finally released in February 1967.
Of the Commission’s many recommendations, the most central was its conclusion 
that “taxes should be allocated according to the changes in the economic power of 
individuals and families.”116 Emphasizing that “[t]he first and most essential purpose of 
taxation is to share the burden of the state fairly among all individuals and families”,117 a 
majority of the Commissioners rejected any distinction among different sources of 
changes to a taxpayer’s economic power,118 proposing a “comprehensive tax base” 
according to which the “all the net gains … of each tax unit” should be subject to tax “on 
113
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an annual basis”.119 Among the implications of this approach, gifts and inheritances 
would be included in the comprehensive tax base for the year in which they were 
received,120 and capital gains and losses would be fully recognized on an accrual basis 
irrespective of any sale.121 For administrative reasons, however, the Commission 
retreated from accrual treatment for capital gains and losses, recommending instead that 
these gains and losses should be recognized on a realization basis, as well as when 
property is transferred by way of gift or on death.122 Since gifts and inheritances would be 
included in the recipient’s income, the Commission also recommended that separate 
wealth transfer taxes should be repealed.123 Other key recommendations included the 
introduction of a family tax unit (including dependent children),124 a reduction in the top 
marginal rate from 80 percent to 50 percent,125 the complete integration of corporate and 
personal income taxes,126 and a dramatic reduction in tax concessions for income from 
mineral and petroleum extraction.127
2. Federal Reform: 1967-1971
While the Commission’s Report was hailed by leading tax academics as “a 
landmark in the annals of taxation”,128 affluent individuals and the business and 
professional interests that pushed for the Commission’s formation were overwhelmingly 
119 Ibid., Vol. 3, at 39. Two Commissioners (Beauvais and Grant) dissented from this recommendation. See 
ibid., Vol. 1, at 51-111.
120 Ibid., Vol. 3, at 41.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. at 368-80.
123 Ibid. at 473 and 513 
124 Ibid., chapter 10.
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negative.129 Although a reduction in the top marginal rate and repeal of wealth transfer 
taxes would provide some benefit for affluent individuals, this would be more than offset 
by the full taxation of capital gains and the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in income. 
While the Report estimated that 64 percent of Canadian taxpayers would pay lower taxes 
under its proposals, these reductions averaged only about 5 percent of taxes otherwise 
payable and were generally limited to taxpayers with incomes of less than $35,000 in 
1964.130 In contrast, 27,000 taxpayers with incomes over $35,000 could have expected to 
pay an additional $1,000 on average, while an estimated 633 individuals with incomes 
over $300,000 could have expected to pay an average of more than $67,000 in additional 
taxes.131 The mining industry stood to lose the most, as the Report’s proposed withdrawal 
of net depletion allowance and a three-year tax holiday were expected to increase its 
taxes by more than 100 percent – most of which would have been paid by the 15 largest 
companies.132 Not surprisingly, therefore, mining companies led organized opposition to 
the Report, threatening the cessation of Canadian investments, and enlisting the support 
of premiers from Western provinces where the extraction industries predominated.133
At the end of April 1967, then Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp announced a 
timetable to deal with the Report, inviting comments on the major recommendations by 
September of that year, and promising a White Paper incorporating the government’s 
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proposals thereafter and draft legislation to be enacted by the end of 1968.134 Within two 
weeks, however, Sharp responded to pressure from the mining industry by guaranteeing 
that the three year tax exemption for new mines would remain until the end of 1973, 
whatever decisions were made on the basis of the Report of the Royal Commission.135 By 
autumn 1967, Sharp had received over a thousand responses, including 150 substantial 
submissions, mostly from corporations and business and professional organizations, and 
mostly critical.136 While many of these submissions opposed the withdrawal of special 
tax preferences,137 considerable criticism was also directed at the Commission’s emphasis 
on fairness as “the first and most essential purpose of taxation” and at the comprehensive 
tax base in particular. Imperial Oil, for example, opposed the “sacrifice of economic 
growth to the commission’s concept of equity.”138 The Trust Companies Association 
warned that the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in the income tax base “would remove 
a major incentive for Canadians to work and produce for the benefit of their families” 
resulting in a “very large annual disappearance of private capital”.139
The Government’s first official response to the Report came on November 30, 
1967, when the Minister of Finance tabled the federal budget. Identifying as common 
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concerns in the submissions that he had received both the uncertain impact of such far-
reaching reforms and the need to attract foreign capital, Sharp announced that whatever
proposals the Government would “place before parliament and the public in the form of a 
White Paper and ultimately in draft legislation” would “undoubtedly be influenced” by 
the Report of the Commission, but “will be more in the nature of reforms to the existing 
tax structure rather than the adoption of a radically different approach.”140 In other words, 
the Government would adopt a more piecemeal approach to tax reform, rather than the 
comprehensive framework adopted by the Commission. Before any more specific 
proposals could be formulated, however, the Government was thrown into turmoil when 
then Prime Minister Lester Pearson announced his intention to resign in December 1967 
and a leadership race and federal election intervened.141
With a new Liberal Government under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, the 
promised White Paper was predictably delayed. In April 1968, the new Finance Minister 
Edgar Benson announced a change in the government’s tax reform schedule, explaining 
that major reforms would not be presented until some time in 1969.142 In the interim, 
however, the Government signalled its rejection of the Commission’s comprehensive tax 
base by introducing major revisions to the federal gift and estate taxes in the October 
1968 federal budget: exempting inter-spousal transfers, integrating these taxes in the form 
of a cumulative progressive tax, and increasing rates on estates valued at less than $5 
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141
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million.143 Defending the continued existence of a separate gift and estate tax, the 
Finance Minister explained that he respected “the intellectual coherence and elegance” of 
the Commission’s recommendation, but that “the overwhelming weight of Canadian 
opinion is against it now, and many Canadian practices and institutions would be 
seriously disrupted if we embraced this proposal.”144
Not surprisingly, given the increased impact on small and medium-sized estates, 
the amendments to the gift and estate tax generated considerable political opposition, 
particularly from owners of small businesses and family farms who had played a 
relatively minor role in opposition to the Royal Commission Report.145 In Western 
Canada, where farming interests were particularly strong, the provincial governments of 
Alberta and Saskatchewan acceded to this sector by refunding the provincial share of the 
federal estate tax to estates from which it had been collected.146 In these two provinces, 
therefore, estate taxes were effectively reduced by 75 percent.
In this context, the long-awaited White Paper was finally released on November 
7, 1969.147 Although explicitly rejecting the Commission’s comprehensive tax base,148 as 
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well as several other proposals such as family taxation149 and the elimination of all 
resource tax incentives,150 the White Paper agreed with the Commission Report that, as a 
general rule, capital gains should be fully taxable at ordinary rates.151 In order to prevent 
the concurrent application of capital gains tax and estate tax “at a most inconvenient 
time”, however, the White Paper rejected the Commission’s proposal that capital gains 
should be recognized when property is transferred at death, recommending instead that 
“the person who inherits the assets be treated as if he had purchased them at their cost to 
the deceased” plus “part of the death taxes paid on the assets in question – the part that 
relates to the capital gain.”152 In the case of gifts, though, the White Paper recommended 
that capital gains be taxable in the year of the gift and that the person receiving the 
property be treated “as if he had purchased the asset for its fair market value.”153 Finally, 
and unexpectedly, the White Paper recommended that shareholders in widely-held 
Canadian corporations should be required to recognize accrued gains and losses every 
five years – though only half of these gains and losses would be recognized for tax
purposes.154
In the White Paper itself, the Minister of Finance welcomed “public discussion of 
the proposals … before Parliament is asked to approve a bill to implement tax reform.”155
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For this purpose, the Government’s preferred vehicle was the parliamentary hearings on 
the White Paper conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, 
Trade and Economic Affairs and the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce. Unlike Congressional Committees in the United States, these committees had 
limited staff and minimal technical knowledge, and were completely unprepared for the 
difficult task of reviewing and commenting upon detailed tax proposals.156 The Commons 
committee alone received 524 briefs and 1,093 letters, and heard 211 oral presentations 
from 820 individuals.157
The vast majority of these submissions were from corporations and business 
associations,158 most of which were highly critical of the proposals to tax capital gains at 
ordinary rates and to tax accrued gains on widely-held shares every five years.159 Many 
organizations also objected to the taxation of capital gains as well as gifts and estates, 
notwithstanding the White Paper’s proposal to defer the recognition of gains on bequests 
until the property is ultimately sold.160 The Ontario Government released a set of counter-
proposals in June 1970, recommending significantly lower capital gains tax rates, 
taxation of accrued gains at death, and a simultaneous and substantial reduction in wealth 
transfer taxes.161 Small business owners organized a broader campaign of public 
advertisements, letters, speaking tours, and rallies under the banner of the Canadian 
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Council for Fair Taxation, established in December 1969.162 According to the group’s 
founder and President, John Bulloch, the combination of capital gains tax and the estate 
tax amounted to “an attack on the middle-class values of hard work, thrift and initiative” 
and a “confiscation of the money and resources of the huge middle segment of the 
population”.163 At the height of the campaign, the Government was reported to be 
receiving protest letters at a rate of 7,000 each day.164
When the parliamentary committees reported in the fall of 1970, it was not 
surprising that they would “reflect in varying degrees the overwhelmingly hostile 
reaction of representatives of the business and professional organisations from whom the 
bulk of the brief and other submissions were received.”165 According to the Commons 
committee, the one-half inclusion rate for shares of widely-held corporations should be 
extended to all capital assets,166 the five-year realization rule for these shares should be 
abandoned,167 and the proposal to tax accrued gains at death should be restored in order 
to prevent indefinite deferral.168 Since the last of these recommendations would, the
committee noted, “magnif[y] the problem, brought to the committee’s attention 
innumerable times, of the concurrent impact of the two taxes at the same time, at death,” 
a further recommendation proposed a reduction of the federal estate tax “across the 
board, either by reducing the rates or by expanding the brackets.”169 The Senate 
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committee went further, recommending a distinction between short-term and long-term 
gains and a rate of tax on the latter limited to the lesser of 25 percent or half the marginal 
income tax rate of the taxpayer,170 and the postponement of tax on transfers of property 
by gift as well as at death, with a carryover of the donor’s cost to the recipient.171 In 
addition, the committee suggested, the government “might well consider abandoning the 
estate tax field to the provinces.”172
The Government, which had given itself room to manoeuvre by presenting its 
response to the Commission Report in the form of a White Paper rather than a budget,173
substantially revised its proposals in light of the parliamentary committee reports and the 
organized opposition, releasing its final tax reform package in the form of draft 
legislation accompanying the federal budget on June 18, 1971.174 Following the 
recommendations of the Commons committee, the draft legislation adopted a one-half 
inclusion rate for all capital gains and losses accruing after a designated valuation day,175
dropped the White Paper proposal to tax accrued gains on widely-traded shares every five 
years,176 and accepted the Carter Commission’s original proposal to tax accrued gains 
when property is transferred on death as well as by gift.177 Following the 
recommendation of the Senate committee, the Government decided to abandon the estate 
and gift tax field to the provinces.178
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The reasons for the Government’s decision were expressed in four short 
paragraphs in its Summary of 1971 Tax Reform Legislation. First, it explained, the 
combination of capital gains tax and estate tax at death “could in some instances result in 
substantial tax impact arising on the death of a taxpayer.”179 Second, it continued, “[a] 
reduction in federal estate taxes to the extent suggested by the Commons committee 
would result in a revenue loss of about half the $55 million now received by the federal 
government from this source” after payment of the provincial share to provincial 
governments.180 Third, it concluded, “[t]wo provinces now return their entire share of 
estate taxes to estates and it is no longer possible to establish a uniform national system 
of death duties through federal legislation.”181 As a result, it concluded, “[i]n these 
circumstances, it has been decided that the federal government will vacate the estate and 
gift tax field on December 31, 1971.”182 Thus, it would seem, the introduction of capital 
gains tax at death, the low revenue yield for the federal government, and the disparate 
effects of federal and provincial joint occupancy of the field led to the repeal of the 
federal gift and estate tax. Unstated, of course, was the organized opposition to capital 
gains and wealth transfer taxes reflected in public campaigns and submissions to the 
parliamentary committees.
By sacrificing the federal gift and estate tax, the Government finally obtained the 
acquiescence of organized interest groups to the introduction of capital gains tax and the 
recognition of accrued gains at death. In a letter to the editor of the Toronto Daily Star, 
Canadian Council for Fair Taxation President John Bulloch praised the “highly 
179 Ibid.
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nationalistic” tax legislation for abolishing wealth transfer taxes “that would, in 
combination with capital gains taxes, have forced the sale of family businesses, 
frequently to foreign interests.”183 The construction industry and the Canadian Real 
Estate Association welcomed the repeal of the federal gift and estate tax because “the 
small builder is still the backbone of the residential construction industry.”184 The 
business press was generally favourable, characterizing the tax reform legislation as “a 
far superior tax plan” to the White Paper.185 Aside from a critical editorial in the Toronto 
Daily Star,186 and unfavourable commentary from a few Canadian tax academics,187 the 
predominant public response to the repeal of the federal gift and estate tax was silence.188
In Parliament, where the Liberal Party held a comfortable majority, enactment of 
the draft legislation was never in doubt. While the Progressive-Conservative Leader of 
the Opposition criticized the Government for the inconsistency of amending the gift and 
estate tax in 1968 and repealing it three years later,189 he and the members of his 
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parliamentary caucus generally supported the decision to repeal the federal gift and estate 
tax. In fact, several complained that since provincial governments might continue to levy 
succession duties, the taxation of capital gains at death could create “extreme hardship” –
particularly for family farms.190 Only members of the social democratic New Democratic 
Party opposed abolition of the tax, criticizing the Government for abandoning the Prime 
Minister’s campaign promise of a “Just Society” by ignoring equality of opportunity and 
tax progressivity.191 After minor technical amendments, the draft legislation was passed 
on December 17, 1971, and came into effect on January 1, 1972.
tax on very small estates.  Now, with great fanfare the minister announces its abolition, also for the very 
best of reasons”); and ibid. (17 December 1971) at 10572 (Hon. Robert Stanfield) (contending that after the 
reform of the estate tax in 1968, the minister of finance was “doing away with all of what he put before the 
House two years previously and all that he had fought for in the House”).
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November 1971) at 9589 (Hon. Marcel J.A. Lambert) (suggesting that federal and provincial estate taxes 
have contributed to foreign ownership of Canadian businesses, and are “the reason family businesses have 
been sold to strangers, whether they are from the United States or elsewhere”).
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3. Provincial Aftermath: 1971-1985
At the provincial level, the federal government’s decision to repeal the federal gift 
and estate tax was generally opposed.192 Although the Province of Quebec had long 
favoured exclusive provincial jurisdiction of these taxes193 and welcomed federal 
abandonment of the field,194 most other provinces objected to the loss of revenue from 
federal rental payments and worried about the prospect of tax competition among 
provinces opting to collect their own succession duties.195 Smaller provinces in particular 
complained about the lack of prior consultation and the absence of adequate notice to 
establish their own gift and succession duties, as well as the administration and collection 
costs that this would entail,196 requesting the federal government to maintain the existing 
system of estate and gift taxation for at least a year from January 1, 1972, to give them 
time to address the implications of the federal proposal.197 Although it refused to accede 
to this request, the federal government nonetheless offered to administer and collect 
provincially-imposed succession duties and gift taxes for a period of three years, 
provided that: (1) the agreements were entered into by at least four provinces; (2) that 
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each participating province would agree to a model Act under which the base of the tax 
would be the same for all provinces; (3) that “some degree of uniformity of rates would 
be provided under the model Acts having regard to the rates now in effect  in those 
provinces imposing their own succession duties;” and (4) that “it would be clear that the 
federal government’s role is purely administrative and that the presentation to the public 
would make it clear that it is a provincial, not a federal tax.”198
In Alberta, where the provincial share of the federal estate tax had been refunded 
since 1967, the provincial government made it clear that it had no intention to enter into 
any such agreement and would not introduce its own wealth transfer tax.199 In Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan, however, where the social-democratic New Democratic Party 
(N.D.P.) had won provincial elections in 1969 and 1971, as well as the four Atlantic 
Provinces, provincial governments accepted the federal government’s offer and 
introduced largely uniform succession duties and gift taxes.200 In order to protect their 
succession duties, British Columbia and Ontario entered into agreements with the federal 
government for the collection of gift tax, and Quebec enacted its own gift tax which it 
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collected as of January 1, 1972.201 At the beginning of 1972, therefore, the federal 
government was collecting the uniform succession duty for six provinces and gift tax for 
eight provinces, the governments of British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec were 
collecting their own succession duties, Quebec was collecting its own gift tax, and 
Alberta levied no wealth transfer taxes. Not surprisingly, this situation did not last very 
long.
Of the six provinces accepting the federal government’s offer to administer and 
collect provincial succession duties, Prince Edward Island was the first to repeal its 
succession duty legislation, which it did before any tax was even collected.202 Estimating 
that total collections from the new tax over three years would amount to only 
$240,000,203 the provincial government apparently concluded that the anticipated revenue 
was simply not worth the effort. In his Budget Speech in 1973, however, the Province’s 
Minister of Finance proudly declared that “Alberta and Prince Edward Island are 
presently the only two provinces without some form of death duties.”204 Fearing the loss 
of investment to this “tax haven”, the government of Nova Scotia announced on February 
23, 1973 that it’s succession duty and gift tax would expire by March 31, 1974.205 A 
month later, New Brunswick’s Minister of Finance blamed “tax policies in other 
provinces” when he announced the repeal of his province’s succession duty and gift tax 
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202
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effective December 31, 1973.206 Newfoundland concluded the abolition of wealth transfer 
taxes in Atlantic Canada by repealing its succession duty and gift tax effective April 9, 
1974.207
In Western Canada, where Alberta became Canada’s first “death tax haven” when 
it refused to enact a succession duty or gift tax in 1972,208 provincial wealth transfer taxes 
lasted only a few more years. Although the Premier of British Columbia promised in June 
1972 to repeal his province’s succession duty and gift tax by 1 April 1973, 209 the election 
of a N.D.P. Government the next month put this policy on hold.210  When the collection 
agreements with the federal government expired at the end of 1974, British Columbia 
assumed the administration of its own gift tax, and N.D.P. Governments in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan began collecting their own succession duties and gift taxes.211 The election 
of the conservative Social Credit Party in British Columbia at the end of 1975, however, 
marked the beginning of the end of wealth transfer taxes in Western Canada. In his 1977 
Budget Speech, British Columbia’s Minister of Finance announced that the provincial 
succession duty and gift tax would be abolished in order to prevent the “forced” sale of 
family farms and businesses to “outsiders” and “to encourage the retention and 
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accumulation of capital by residents of British Columbia.”212 Later that year, the N.D.P. 
Government in Saskatchewan announced that it would repeal the provincial succession 
duty and gift tax, notwithstanding the Government’s conviction that “a tax on wealth is a 
fair tax” – attributing this decision to the abolition of these taxes in other provinces and 
“a widespread opinion that the successors of the average citizen will be subject to the 
tax” even though it applied to less than 3 percent of estates in Saskatchewan.213 Although 
the N.D.P. Government in Manitoba maintained its commitment to provincial wealth 
transfer taxes in its 1977 budget,214 a Conservative Government was elected later that 
year, and repealed these taxes in early 1978.215
By 1978, therefore, Ontario and Quebec were the only Canadian jurisdictions that 
continued to collect succession duties and gift taxes.216 In each of these provinces, 
however, provincial governments had adopted a policy of gradually reducing these taxes 
over time as revenues from the taxation of post-1971 capital gains increased – regarding 
these taxes as temporary measures to maintain revenues until “the capital gains tax 
matures.”217 In Ontario, where succession duty rates were originally increased in 1972 in 
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order to compensate for the loss of federal rental payments,218 basic exemptions were 
increased from $100,000 to $150,000 in 1974,219 $250,000 in 1975,220 and $300,000 in 
1977.221 Making the perceived connection between succession duty and capital gains tax 
explicit, the 1977 Budget also made capital gains tax payable at death creditable against 
succession duties.222 Two years later, the provincial Government repealed Ontario’s 
succession duty and gift tax, declaring that “the continuation of this tax is hurting our 
economic performance and costing us jobs” and that “the present combination of other 
taxes provided government with an adequate return as wealth is accumulated.”223
In Quebec, succession duties were reduced by 20 percent in each year from 1974 
to 1977, resulting in a total reduction in tax otherwise payable of 80 percent by 1977.224
With the election of the sovereigntist and social democratic Parti Québecois (P.Q.) in 
November 1976, however, the final 20 percent reduction that had been scheduled for 
1978 was cancelled in the new Government’s first budget.225 The next year, the P.Q. 
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Government announced that the provincial succession duty would be retained but 
substantially amended, with rates based solely on amounts received by each beneficiary, 
the total exemption of bequests between spouses, and further exemptions for transfers to 
children and other dependents.226  The legislation, which was introduced in Quebec’s 
National Assembly in June 1978, was enacted on 22 December 1978, and came into 
effect immediately.227 Over the next several years, the tax raised up to about $45 million 
per year,228 but the Government faced continuing pressure to abolish provincial wealth 
transfer taxes “because such duties do not exist elsewhere in Canada”.229 With a new 
Minister of Finance, and a provincial election on the horizon (which it lost), the P.Q. 
Government repealed Quebec’s succession duty and gift tax on 23 April 1985.230
B. The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes in Australia
Unlike Canada, where the events leading to the repeal of federal and provincial 
wealth transfer taxes began with the appointment of a Royal Commission, the abolition of 
wealth transfer taxes in Australia originated in a popular protest movement initiated by a 
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skilled carpenter and building contractor from Western Australia named Sydney 
Negus.231 In 1970, after learning that estate duty could have a substantial impact on 
relatively modest amounts left to his wife, Negus launched a successful petition 
campaign calling for the abolition of estate duties, ran for public office, and was elected 
to the Federal Senate.232 As Willard Pedrick observes, “the election of an Independent, 
whose only campaign issue had been abolition of death duties, was not lost on 
professional party leaders.”233 Little more than a decade later, Australian wealth transfer 
taxes had completely disappeared.
Three factors appear to have contributed to the strength of Australia’s estate duty 
abolition movement in the early 1970s, particularly among farmers and small business 
owners.234 First and foremost, exemptions had not been increased to account for inflation, 
causing Commonwealth and State taxes to apply to relatively modest estates.235 At the 
federal level, for example, the Commonwealth estate duty at the time contained an 
exemption of only AU$10,000 for estates passing to a spouse, child or grandchild, and 
AU$5,000 for all other estates.236 As a result, as the Taxation Review Committee (Asprey 
Committee) reported, over 55 percent of taxable estates in 1972-73 were valued at less 
than AU$40,000 and almost 83 percent were valued at less than AU$80,000.237 At the 
State level, exemptions were generally lower, resulting in a larger number of taxable 
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estates.238 Farming interests consistently complained that farms had to be sold to pay the 
duties, though evidence to this effect was “sparse and mostly anecdotal.”239 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, it was political leaders with a rural political base who pushed the 
abolition agenda.240
In addition to the failure to adjust estate duties for inflation, a second factor 
contributing to the unpopularity of these taxes was the failure to integrate the 
Commonwealth and State duties.241 While the existence of this “double or duplicative” 
system of wealth transfer taxes increased compliance costs for all taxable estates,242 the 
relative burden was likely higher for small and medium-sized estates.243 In addition, a 
study for the Asprey Committee concluded that the costs to comply with the 
Commonwealth and State taxes were larger for estates with small businesses than for 
most other estates.244 Despite several recommendations to allocate this revenue source 
either solely to the states or solely to the Commonwealth government, however, joint 
occupancy remained until the taxes were finally repealed.245
A final explanation for the strength of Australia’s estate duty abolition movement 
relates to the relative ease with which these taxes could be avoided.246 Discretionary 
trusts, for example, could be used to transfer wealth from generation to generation 
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without any tax.247 At the federal level, gift tax was not integrated with estate duty, and 
gifts themselves were aggregated only over an eighteen month period.248 Because of 
these and other deficiencies,249 the tax was generally considered to be easily avoided by 
the most affluent and sophisticated taxpayers,250 shifting the primary burden to small and 
medium-sized estates.251 As a result, as one commentator explains, “[t]he extent of tax 
avoidance … created public cynicism about the taxes.”252
At the same time as the unpopularity of these taxes increased, their importance to 
Commonwealth and State revenues declined. In 1973, the Commonwealth government 
collected roughly AU$75 million from its gift and estate duties, representing only 0.7 
percent of total tax revenues – a lower percentage than at any time in their history.253
While the States collected approximately $185 million from their wealth transfer taxes in 
1973,254 accounting for almost 9 percent of total tax revenues,255 this percentage had 
declined substantially from only a few years earlier due to the transfer of the payroll tax 
field from the Commonwealth to the State governments in 1971,256 and was lower than at 
any time since the end of the Second World War.257 As inflation caused more and more 
small estates to become taxable, moreover, net revenues suffered because administrative 
247
 Hill, Death and Gift Duties, Taxation Review Committee Commissioned Studies (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1975) at 75-76, cited in Pedrick, supra note 94 at 122.
248
 Hill, supra note 248 at 92 and 105-06, cited in Pedrick, supra note 94 at 122-232.
249
 For a detailed description, see Pedrick, supra note 94 at 122-24.
250
 See, e.g., Taxation Review Committee, supra note 92 at 115 (concluding that the Commonwealth estate 
duty “is certainly at present a tax which can be avoided by well-advised persons with ease, and which 
might almost be said to be paid principally from the estates of those who died unexpectedly or who had 
failed to attend to their affairs with proper skill”).
251
 Smith, supra note 70 at 79-80.
252 Ibid. at 79.
253
 Saunders, supra note 72 at 399 (Table 1). Income taxes, on the other hand, accounted for almost 70 
percent of total tax revenues in 1973. Calculated from figures in O.E.C.D, supra note 2.
254
 Calculated from figures in Saunders, supra note 72 at 399 (Table 1).
255
 Calculated from figures in O.E.C.D., supra note 3.
51
costs were incurred to obtain relatively amounts of revenue from these estates.258 In 
1972-73, for example, the smallest 55.7 percent of estates subject to Commonwealth 
estate duty accounted for only 3.9 percent of revenue collected.259 Joint occupancy by the 
Commonwealth and State governments also contributed to high administrative costs as 
both levels of government as well as all State governments were required to maintain the 
organizational apparatus to enforce and collect the taxes.
The abolition movement’s first legislative victory was in Queensland, a “hotbed 
of agrarian resentment against death duties”, where the Brisbane Courier Mail had run a 
series of articles highlighting the hardships caused by death duties and the growing 
campaign for abolition.260 After exempting inter-spousal transfers from estate and gift 
duties in 1975,261 the conservative Liberal-Country Party coalition government embraced 
complete abolition in 1976 and repealed the taxes effective January 1, 1977.262 Although 
the coalition’s Liberal Party Treasurer Sir Gordon Chalk expressed misgivings about the 
budgetary implications of abolition, which would reduce State revenues by $25 to $30 
million dollars per year,263 Country Party Premier Joh Bjelke-Peterson apparently 
concluded that the loss in revenues would be more than offset by internal migrants 
attracted by the combination of a warm climate and tax-free bequests.264 Indeed, before 
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the repeal had even come into effect, the Gold Coast Visitor’s Bureau prepared a 
pamphlet entitled “Legal Information on the Abolition of Death Duties in Queensland” 
reporting the duty payable in other States on an estate of $100,000 and detailing the ways 
in which death duties could be avoided by investment or domicile in Queensland.265
Not surprisingly, other States responded to this interstate tax competition by 
amending and then abolishing their own gift and estate duties. In 1976, inter-spousal 
transfers were exempted in New South Wales and South Australia,266 and the State of 
Victoria enacted legislation exempting estates passing to spouses, children and 
grandchildren from duty in stages between 1976 and 1981.267 Over the next three years, 
Tasmania introduced exemptions first for inter-spousal transfers and then all transfers.268
In Western Australia, inter-spousal transfers were made exempt in 1977 and gift and 
estate duties were abolished in 1980.269 Finally, South Australia abolished its gift and 
estate duties in 1980 and New South Wales in 1981.270 As a result, as one commentator 
has written, “by the early 1980s, the momentum against any death taxation in Queensland 
carried all other state death duties to the grave.”271
At the Commonwealth level, interstate competition was obviously not an issue. 
Nonetheless, the political momentum of the estate duty abolition movement proved 
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overwhelming. After Mr. Negus was elected, and before Queensland abolished its gift 
and estate duties, a Senate Committee examined the subject of wealth transfer taxes, 
recommending that the Commonwealth vacate the field, leaving the States to negotiate a 
uniform base and rates.272 Of the eight Senators on the Committee, however, three filed a 
dissenting report recommending that the Commonwealth repeal its gift and estate duties 
and that the States be encouraged to reduce their taxes with a view to their eventual 
abolition.273 Although the Asprey Committee affirmed an important role for wealth 
transfer taxation when it delivered its Report in January 1975,274 recommending a 
national integrated gift and estate duty designed to reduce administration and compliance 
costs and to minimize opportunities for avoidance,275 the effort to modernize these taxes 
appears to have been too late.276 In the election that followed the Australian constitutional 
crisis later that year,277 former Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam promised to abolish 
Commonwealth estate and gift duties in an unsuccessful effort to return to power.278
During the 1977 election campaign, the incumbent Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser announced the immediate exemption of all transfers to a spouse or a child, and 
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promised to abolish Commonwealth estate and gift duties altogether if re-elected.279 After 
the Liberal-Country Coalition won a majority on 10 December 1977, the Government 
introduced legislation to repeal these taxes effective 1 July 1979.280 Although the Labor 
Party moved to withdraw the legislation “until such time as an alternative form of tax on 
capital is introduced,”281 the motion was defeated along party lines and the legislation 
was enacted in 1978.282
C. The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes in New Zealand
Though separated from the Australian mainland by more than a thousand miles of 
water, New Zealand was not immune from the effects of estate and gift duty abolition in 
Australia. Under pressure from farming interests, who complained that increased land 
values resulted in a larger estate tax burden,283 the New Zealand Government amended 
the estate and gift duties in 1979 by significantly increasing the basic exemption in stages 
from $25,000 to $250,000 in 1982.284 Little more than a decade later, the estate tax was 
effectively abolished by reducing to zero the rate of tax on persons dying on or after 17 
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December 1992.285 In 1999, further legislation formally repealed New Zealand’s estate 
tax, though its gift tax remains in place.286
Although less than one percent of decedents were subject to the tax in 1992,287
abolition of estate duty was welcomed by New Zealand’s leading agricultural 
organization, Federated Farmers of New Zealand, which praised the legislation as a 
“victor[y] for rural business and communities.”288 From the government’s perspective, 
while the tax raised approximately NZ$80 million in 1992, this accounted for less than 
0.3 percent of total tax revenues.289 Finally, as Cedric Sandford has suggested, New 
Zealand’s estate duty “may also owe its demise, at least in part, to what happened in 
Australia, because of the free movement of nationals between New Zealand and 
Australia”.290 As an estate-type tax based on the estates of persons dying while domiciled 
in New Zealand, New Zealand’s tax, like that of the Australian States, was particularly 
vulnerable to tax-motivated emigration by affluent retirees.
D. Public Choice Theory and the Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes
Writing in 1978, Canadian economist Richard Bird characterized the 
disappearance of Canada’s wealth transfer taxes as “strange”.291 Writing in 1983, 
Australian economist John Head described the abolition of Australia’s federal estate and 
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gift duty as “totally incomprehensible”.292 More recently, Cedric Sandford argued that the 
abolition of wealth transfer taxes in both countries “had an accidental element about 
it”.293 While there is certainly a large element of contingency to the events culminating in 
the abolition of these taxes in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, public choice theory 
suggests that the outcome in each of these cases is neither “strange”, nor 
“incomprehensible”, nor entirely “accidental”. On the contrary, the abolition of wealth 
transfer taxes in these countries was in many respects a predictable response to the 
shifting political costs of these and other taxes.
In Canada, the Carter Commission’s proposals to tax gifts and inheritances as 
income and capital gains at death significantly increased the political costs of the federal 
gift and estate tax as well as provincial succession duties – taxes for which the political 
costs were already high given their application to a relatively narrow group of people. 
While the 1968 amendments to the federal gift and estate tax might have lowered 
political costs by rejecting the Carter Commission’s proposal to tax gifts and inheritances 
as income and exempting inter-spousal transfers, political costs were clearly increased by 
integrating the gift and estate taxes and increasing federal rates on estates valued at less 
than $5 million. Not surprisingly, these amendments galvanized farming and small 
business interests, increasing further the political costs of Canadian wealth transfer taxes 
and federal tax reform more generally.
Although the White Paper attempted to contain these political costs by rejecting 
the taxation of accrued gains at death, the proposals to tax capital gains at ordinary rates 
and widely-held shares every five years were politically very costly, since these measures 
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would “impose obvious and substantial new burdens on a relatively small but affluent, 
articulate and well organised section of the community which could hardly be expected to 
stand idly by”, resulting in benefits that “would be widely dispersed over the relatively 
unorganised mass of taxpayers at the bottom of the income scale.”294 Clearly expecting 
opposition from organized interest groups, the Government attempted to manage the tax 
reform process by referring its proposals to parliamentary committees. These committees, 
however, were completely unprepared for this task and served mostly as “sounding 
board[s] for those segments of public opinion that were most vocal”295 – namely, the 
organized interest groups that had opposed the Carter Commission’s proposals from the 
outset. Predictably, the parliamentary committee reports “reflect[ed] in varying degrees 
the overwhelmingly hostile reaction of representatives of the business and professional 
organizations from whom the bulk of the briefs and other submissions were received.”296
Finally, confronting the prospect of substantial revenues from the introduction of capital 
gains tax versus minimal revenues from the gift and estate tax (75 percent of which was 
transferred to provincial governments or abated in the case of provinces collecting their 
own succession duties), the federal government opted to withdraw from the wealth 
transfer tax field, enacting a capital gains tax on half the amount of the gain with accrued 
gains taxable at death.
At the provincial level, several governments endeavoured to maintain wealth 
transfer taxes, though the eventual abolition of these taxes was probably inevitable when 
Alberta refused to enact a provincial succession duty and gift tax in 1972. With low 
revenues, high administrative costs, and the risk of inter-provincial migration, wealth 
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transfer taxes were abolished in Atlantic Canada by 1974, Western Canada by 1978, and 
Ontario in 1979. While Quebec held out, substantially amending its succession duty in 
1978, even it succumbed to the pressures of horizontal tax competition, repealing its 
succession duty and gift tax in 1985.
In Australia, the political costs of estate and gift duties collected by 
Commonwealth and State governments increased significantly in the late 1960s and early 
1970s as inflation eroded the real value of exemptions, increasing the number of taxable 
estates. Even before then, the political costs of these taxes were probably high, given 
their relatively narrow application and the high administrative and compliance costs 
resulting from joint occupancy by both levels of government. Not surprisingly, those who 
were subject to the tax established an organized movement pressing for abolition of the 
taxes. As the political costs of these taxes increased and government reliance on estate 
and gift duties as a source of revenue decreased, these governments looked at other less 
politically costly sources of revenue as alternatives to these taxes. When Queensland 
abolished its estate and gift duties effective 1 January 1977, horizontal tax competition 
quickly led to the abolition of these taxes in all other States. At the federal level, 
Committees made recommendations for major reform, but the political momentum of the 
abolition movement carried the day and Commonwealth gift and estate duties were 
repealed effective 1 July 1979. New Zealand held out for a little more than a decade, but 
the combination of political opposition, low revenues and horizontal tax competition 
proved fatal there as well as the estate tax was repealed effective 17 December 1992.
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IV. Conclusion
Opponents of wealth transfer taxes are apt to take comfort both from their 
abolition in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and from public choice explanations for 
these events, and proponents may despair. As an advocate of these taxes myself,297 this is 
obviously not what I intend. Although wealth transfer taxes were abolished in Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, are under pressure in the United Kingdom, and are 
scheduled to be phased out in the United States, they appear to have retained their vitality 
in several other countries,298 a few of which rely on these taxes more today than they did 
in the early 1970s.299 While political costs and benefits may influence the choices that 
governments make among different revenue sources, these are clearly not the only factors 
as political values and ideologies as well as the structure of state institutions can also play 
an important role.300
Nonetheless, it is important to be realistic about the considerable political 
challenges that are apt to make the retention or reintroduction of wealth transfer taxes 
especially difficult. As experience in Canada, Australia and New Zealand suggests, the 
political costs of these taxes tend to be much higher than those of broad-based income, 
consumption, or payroll taxes, and can increase significantly if tax reforms (Canada) or 
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tax policy inertia (Australia) increase the burden on small and medium-sized estates.301 In 
federal systems, moreover, the political costs of wealth transfer taxes are greatly 
increased by joint occupancy by both levels of government (vertical tax competition) and 
mobility among sub-national jurisdictions (horizontal tax competition). Although the 
costs of horizontal tax competition in this field can be reduced by applying the tax to 
inheritances received by beneficiaries who are resident or domiciled in the taxing 
jurisdiction, since these persons are likely to be less mobile than affluent retirees, the 
example of Quebec (where this “accessions basis” was adopted in 1978 but provincial 
succession duty and gift tax were repealed in 1985), suggests that wealth transfer taxes in 
a federal jurisdiction should be collected by the federal government.
For those who wish to preserve and restore the taxation of wealth transfers, then, 
what lessons can be drawn from the abolition of these taxes in Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand? Reflecting on public choice accounts of tax policy and the historical 
experience in these countries, three conclusions seem evident. First, if wealth transfer 
taxes are to be maintained or reintroduced, the political costs of these taxes cannot be 
allowed to increase beyond a level that is necessary to their essential purposes. Basic 
exemptions, for example, must exclude small and medium-sized estates, and special rules 
must minimize the burden on family-owned enterprises and principal residences – ideally 
by deferring the collection of tax until these assets are sold rather than exempting these 
transfers from tax altogether. Capital gains taxes must be adjusted to lessen the combined 
impact of two taxes when property is transferred by gift or on death, for example by 
permitting the donor’s cost to carryover to the recipient. Administrative and compliance 
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costs must be minimized by integrating federal and sub-national taxes or abolishing the 
latter, by eliminating complex rate structures based on the size of an estate and the shares 
received by different classes of beneficiaries, and by statutory rules designed to minimize 
opportunities for avoidance. Horizontal tax competition must be discouraged by ensuring 
that wealth transfer taxes are collected by federal governments in federal systems and by 
applying these taxes to gifts and inheritances received by beneficiaries who are resident 
or domiciled in the taxing jurisdiction in addition to property situated in the taxing 
jurisdiction and transfers of property by persons domiciled in the taxing jurisdiction.
Second, if governments are to enact the legislative measures necessary to preserve 
or re-establish wealth transfer taxes, methods must be devised in order to protect public 
decision-making processes from the influence of organized interest groups who can be 
expected to oppose these measures. In Canada, for example, the Carter Commission was 
able to produce a Report that was hailed as “a landmark in the annals of taxation” 
because it had both the institutional mandate and the financial resources to engage in a 
thorough and non-partisan analysis of tax policy. In contrast, the parliamentary 
committees that considered the federal government’s White Paper proposals in 1970 were 
thrust into a highly political exercise without the knowledge or resources to withstand the 
pressure exerted by organized interest groups that dominated the process. Although this 
was only one of many factors that led to the eventual abolition of wealth transfer taxes in 
Canada, its impact at the time may have been decisive.
Finally, if these taxes are to retain and attract public support, efforts must also be 
made to increase their perceived benefits. One strategy for this purpose might be to 
earmark the revenues from these taxes to a particular expenditure program, especially a 
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program that complements the redistributive objectives of the tax such as early childhood 
education for children from low-income families. More generally, a greater “tax 
preference” for wealth transfer taxes might result from less emphasis on the revenues 
raised from these taxes, which are bound to be less than taxes on income, consumption or 
payrolls, and more explicit acknowledgement of their symbolic and social function to 
lessen inequalities and unequal opportunities.302 Public support for these taxes might also 
be improved by applying these taxes to amounts received by living beneficiaries rather 
than the aggregate amount of a decedent’s estate, demonstrating that the tax is intended 
not to punish those who have succeeded in life or to compound the misery of death, but to 
regulate the distribution of wealth and opportunities among beneficiaries for whom a gift 
or inheritance is largely undeserved.303 In fact is interesting to note that the decline in 
wealth transfer taxes in O.E.C.D. countries has been much greater among countries with 
estate-type taxes that fall on the estates of persons dying domiciled in the jurisdiction
than countries with inheritance-type taxes that apply to amounts received by beneficiaries 
living in a particular jurisdiction. In addition to any lessons from the history of abolition 
in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, wealth transfer tax advocates might also look to 
the experience of these countries where wealth transfer taxes appear to have been more 
resilient.
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